Two Peoples, One Land
Disputes

Baku, "March Days", 30 March – 1 April 1918

How many Azerbaijanis were killed at Baku in March 1918, and how should the event be characterised?

History all versions

The March Days in Baku were a civil-war battle, an intercommunal massacre and a foundational Azerbaijani trauma. Bolshevik forces under the Baku Soviet, with substantial Dashnak Armenian armed support, defeated Müsavat and Azerbaijani Muslim forces in late March 1918. Azerbaijani civilians were killed in large numbers, with estimates ranging from several thousand to 12,000 or more depending on source and political usage. Azerbaijan’s state designation, the “genocide of Azerbaijanis,” reflects the event’s place in national memory but compresses a complex revolutionary and military struggle into a single ethnic frame. Academic accounts usually describe Bolshevik-Dashnak violence against Muslims in the context of civil war and Baku oil politics, not a stand-alone genocide in the later legal sense.

Events under dispute

Perspectives (2)

How to read this section
Each position is laid out in its own voice first, the way its proponents argue it. Where that argument relies on omitted facts, logical fallacies, or recognised state-propaganda techniques, those are noted in a separate Critique block under the position. The intent is not to suppress any view, but to show what each side asserts and where its case is weaker than the assertion makes it sound.
state-azerbaijan
"March 31 Genocide of Azerbaijanis" (state designation, 1998–)

Azerbaijan commemorates 31 March as the Day of Genocide of Azerbaijanis, a designation established by Heydar Aliyev’s 1998 decree. The state narrative emphasises deliberate mass killing of Azerbaijani civilians by Bolshevik-Dashnak forces and links Baku to wider violence against Muslims in Shamakhi, Quba and other districts.

The full position internal divisions, supporting actors, reception, daily reality — click to collapse

Internal divisions

The 31 March commemoration was institutionalised by heydar aliyev's 1998 decree, replacing earlier Soviet-era silence with a formal genocide designation. The frame links Baku 1918 to wider 1918–20 Muslim-civilian deaths in Shamakhi, Quba, Lankaran and elsewhere; in some Azerbaijani accounts these are presented as a single coordinated programme. Independent Azerbaijani historians have noted that the Bolshevik-Dashnak alliance in baku was driven by oil politics and revolutionary contingency rather than ethnic-extermination intent, but cannot publish this view openly.

How prominent figures argue this

heydar aliyev's 1998 decree frames the event as state-organised. ilham aliyev continues the frame in annual addresses and at the baku memorial. Azerbaijani historians at the National Academy (Yaqub Mahmudov and others) supply the academic infrastructure. The diasporic and Turkish-state amplification through the OIC and the Council of Turkic States adds international weight.

Carriers

The Quba mass-graves memorial, the Baku state memorials, schoolbook treatment, Trend and Azertac state media, the AzEmbassy network internationally. Annual 31 March addresses serve as the principal carriage event.

Reception

Domestic reception is uniform under state-media conditions. International reception is limited: a few Turkic-world states and Pakistan have passed recognition resolutions; most Western states and major international bodies have not. Armenian and Russian responses largely reject the genocide framing.

Daily reality

31 March is a national day of mourning. Public flags fly at half-mast. The Quba mass-graves memorial complex (opened 2013) anchors physical commemoration. Schools observe a moment of silence. State media run extensive coverage on the day.

Statistics

The Azerbaijani official figure for March 1918 deaths in Baku is 12,000+; some accounts give 30,000 across multiple cities. Swietochowski and de Waal place Baku-specific deaths in the low thousands (3,000–12,000). The Quba mass graves discovered in 2007 contained ~400 remains, dated to 1918.

Tensions and recent shifts

Post-2020 state-media usage of the 1918 frame has intensified, often paired with Khojaly to construct a continuous victimological narrative. The frame is now connected analytically to the "Western Azerbaijan" doctrine: 1918 is presented as the first stage of a long Armenian effort to displace Azerbaijani Muslims. editorial

Critique

The state narrative correctly insists that Muslim civilians were massacred, but the genocide framing often flattens the civil-war, Bolshevik and oil-strategic context.

academic-consensus
Academic accounts: civil war between Bolshevik-Dashnak forces and Müsavat

Swietochowski, Kazemzadeh and de Waal describe the March Days as a violent struggle for Baku in which the Bolshevik-led Soviet relied heavily on Armenian Dashnak armed strength against Müsavat. Civilian Muslim deaths were substantial and atrocities occurred. The event was followed months later by the September Days, when Ottoman-Azerbaijani forces took Baku and Armenians were massacred.

The full position internal divisions, supporting actors, reception, daily reality — click to collapse

Internal divisions

The synthesis comes from three traditions: Swietochowski on Russian-Azerbaijani borderland politics, Kazemzadeh on the 1917–21 South Caucasus, and de Waal on the conflict's modern legacy. They agree on the basic shape: Baku in March 1918 was the principal multi-ethnic city of the South Caucasus, controlled by a Bolshevik-led Soviet under shahumyan; the Soviet relied heavily on Dashnak armed strength; the Müsavat-led Azerbaijani national movement contested control. Combat in the city killed Azerbaijani Muslim civilians on a large scale.

How prominent figures argue this

shahumyan (1878–1918), Armenian Bolshevik and Baku Soviet chair, was the central figure on the Bolshevik-Dashnak side. rasulzade led the Müsavat side. Azerbaijani survivor accounts compiled in the early 1920s emphasise mass civilian deaths; Bolshevik accounts emphasised the military defeat of "counter-revolutionary" Müsavat forces. The event was followed in September 1918 by the September Days, when Ottoman-Müsavat forces under nuri pasha took the city and massacred 10,000–30,000 Armenian civilians.

Carriers

Cambridge, Columbia, Princeton, NYU university presses; the journals Slavic Review, Caucasus Survey, Soviet and Post-Soviet Review. The framing is reproduced in ICG historical background documents and Western academic textbooks.

Reception

The synthesis is uncontested in mainstream Western scholarship. Both Azerbaijani and Armenian state historiographies treat it selectively. Russian scholarship is divided; some integrate it (Sergey Tarkhov), others suppress the Bolshevik-Dashnak alliance dimension as awkward.

Daily reality

The synthesis appears in international diplomatic background briefings and academic curricula but rarely reaches either domestic public. The principal "carrier" of the academic view in the public sphere is the cycle of mutual atrocity recognition: scholarly recognition of March 1918 typically appears alongside September 1918, Sumgait, and Khojaly. editorial

Statistics

Swietochowski estimates Azerbaijani civilian deaths in the low thousands (3,000–7,000). de Waal gives 3,000–12,000. The September 1918 reciprocal massacre of Armenians killed 10,000–30,000 (Hovannisian).

Tensions and recent shifts

Recent scholarship has integrated more Ottoman-archival material on the September Days (work by Reynolds, Akçam, Bloxham), making the cyclic reading even stronger. The Azerbaijani official narrative continues to treat March 1918 in isolation; the academic synthesis treats it as one half of an exchange. sourced opinion

Critique

The March and September massacres should be read together as a cycle of urban civil-war violence, not as mutually cancelling victimhoods.

Sources: Tadeusz Swietochowski, 1995 · Thomas de Waal, 2003