Two Peoples, One Land
Disputes

Khojaly, 25–26 February 1992

What happened at Khojaly, who is responsible, and how should it be characterised?

History all versions

Khojaly is the central Azerbaijani atrocity memory of the First Karabakh War. On 25-26 February 1992, after Armenian forces took the town, fleeing Azerbaijani civilians were killed in large numbers. Azerbaijani official memory uses a figure of 613 dead and characterises the event as genocide. Armenian official and semi-official accounts acknowledge civilian deaths but reject the genocide label and dispute intent, command responsibility and casualty totals. Human Rights Watch, Memorial and de Waal establish the core point: Armenian and Karabakh Armenian forces bear responsibility for the killing of civilians, the deaths were in the hundreds, and the event was a grave war crime. The genocide label is politically central in Azerbaijan but is not the standard academic or legal characterisation.

Events under dispute

Perspectives (3)

How to read this section
Each position is laid out in its own voice first, the way its proponents argue it. Where that argument relies on omitted facts, logical fallacies, or recognised state-propaganda techniques, those are noted in a separate Critique block under the position. The intent is not to suppress any view, but to show what each side asserts and where its case is weaker than the assertion makes it sound.
state-azerbaijan
Azerbaijani state position: genocide of Khojaly

Azerbaijan treats Khojaly as genocide and as the paradigmatic proof of Armenian aggression (Thomas de Waal, 2003, pp. 175–176). The official figure of 613 deaths is used in state commemoration, schoolbooks, diplomacy and diaspora campaigns. The event functions as both mourning and counter-memory against Armenian genocide-recognition politics. editorial

The full position internal divisions, supporting actors, reception, daily reality — click to collapse

Internal divisions

The position is institutionally unified but rhetorically layered. The hardest version, used by ilham aliyev and YAP media, treats Khojaly as paradigmatic genocide. A more measured version, used in Azerbaijani diplomatic submissions and in court (including the ECHR and ICJ), acknowledges the technical limits of "genocide" as a legal category but uses "mass atrocity" or "ethnic cleansing" to make the same political point. Some Azerbaijani independent voices (the Eldar Zeynalov circle, journalist Khadija Ismayilova in exile) accept the war-crime framing but resist the genocide label as politically inflated.

How prominent figures argue this

ilham aliyev makes Khojaly a recurring annual address theme on 26 February. mehriban aliyeva runs the commemorative apparatus through the Heydar Aliyev Foundation. Diplomatic carriage by ambassadors in Brussels, Washington, London. Diaspora amplification by the European Azerbaijan Society (TEAS, dissolved 2017 amid scandal) and successor organisations.

Carriers

State commemoration apparatus: 26 February as official day of mourning, the Khojaly Memorial in central baku, schoolbook coverage from grade 7 onward, the "Justice for Khojaly" diaspora campaign launched 2008 by Mehriban Aliyeva. The YAP Caucasus think-tank network. Azerbaijani diplomatic posts internationally distribute Khojaly literature.

Reception

Domestic reception is total. International recognition is uneven: Mexico, Pakistan, several Latin American states, and the OIC have passed Khojaly recognition resolutions. Western states and the EP have not. Reception within Armenia and the Armenian diaspora ranges from acknowledgement of war crime to denial; the wider public reaction has been to point to Sumgait and Baku pogrom as parallels.

Daily reality

Khojaly memorialisation is woven into Azerbaijani public life: street names, postage stamps, mandatory school content, public-television annual coverage. The post-2020 retake of khojaly under Azerbaijani control has allowed physical memorial reconstruction at the site. Armenian discourse on Khojaly is criminalised in Azerbaijan under denial-of-genocide statutes.

Statistics

Official Azerbaijani figure: 613 dead (106 women, 63 children, 70 elderly). Memorial Human Rights Center documented at least 161 confirmed civilian dead. HRW reported deaths in the several hundreds. de Waal places the figure at ~485. Approximately 1,275 hostages were taken; ~150 missing.

Tensions and recent shifts

Post-2020, the state has hardened the genocide framing as part of a wider "victors' justice" narrative. The Azerbaijani Prosecutor General opened formal proceedings against named Armenian commanders in 2022. The 2023 operation partly justified itself by reference to Khojaly's "unfinished accounting". editorial

Critique

Omitted facts. The state narrative typically omits the existence of the announced humanitarian corridor (Memorial Human Rights Center, 1992, Reconstruction §3) and the Mutallibov interview of 2 April 1992, in which the then-president of Azerbaijan attributed the political logic of the killings to the Popular Front (Thomas de Waal, 2003, pp. 176–177 (quoting Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 2 April 1992)). It also omits the reconstruction work of Memorial and HRW, whose findings differ from the official figure on the documented record.

Logical fallacies. The genocide claim equivocates between the colloquial sense (mass killing of an ethnic group) and the legal sense (specific intent to destroy the group as such), a recognised motte-and-bailey pattern in genocide-recognition diplomacy (Human Rights Watch, 1992). The state narrative also commits the false-equivalence move of treating Khojaly as paradigmatic proof of Armenian aggression while withholding equivalent treatment of Sumgait and Baku 1990 as paradigmatic proof of Azerbaijani aggression.

Propaganda techniques. Numerical inflation: the 613 figure has been repeated for three decades without transparent documentation of the underlying tally (Thomas de Waal, 2003, pp. 175–176). Ahistorical projection: ascribing genocidal intent to a 1992 military operation requires importing the subsequent legal framework rather than reading it from the operational record. Manufactured legitimacy: the international "Justice for Khojaly" campaign, run via the Aliyeva Foundation, has secured recognition resolutions from states with little independent scholarly capacity on the conflict and zero recognition from any major Western government, the EP, the UN, the ICJ or the academic mainstream (Thomas de Waal, 2003, Postscript).

What survives. The central fact survives intact: a grave war crime in which Armenian and Karabakh Armenian forces killed civilians in considerable numbers as they fled along an inadequately marked corridor. The political work of memorialisation is legitimate; the legal label and the unverified casualty figure are not. editorial

Sources: European Parliament, 2023
state-armenia
Armenian state position: tragic incident in war, not genocide

The Armenian position tends to stress the battlefield context, the presence of Azerbaijani military positions in and around Khojaly (Thomas de Waal, 2003, pp. 173–175), the offered corridor for civilian exit, and lower casualty figures from Memorial (Memorial Human Rights Center, 1992, Tally §6). It rejects premeditated exterminatory intent and argues that Azerbaijan has instrumentalised the tragedy. editorial

The full position internal divisions, supporting actors, reception, daily reality — click to collapse

Internal divisions

The Armenian position has hardened, softened, and re-hardened over time. Initial 1990s accounts (under ter petrosyan) acknowledged civilian deaths and emphasised battlefield context. The 2000s Republican Party period under kocharyan (himself a former Karabakh military commander present during the operations) and sargsyan hardened the line into denial of any premeditation. Post-2018 Civil Contract under pashinyan returned to the cautious-acknowledgement model. The diaspora is split: some ARF outlets fully deny a massacre took place, while moderate diaspora institutions accept the HRW / Memorial findings.

How prominent figures argue this

kocharyan in interviews has cited the Azerbaijani military positions in Khojaly, the offered "humanitarian corridor", and Azerbaijani forces firing on fleeing civilians. pashinyan has avoided direct engagement with Khojaly, treating it as a 1990s-vintage controversy rather than a current dispute. Armenian human-rights NGOs have generally accepted the Memorial framing while resisting the genocide label.

Carriers

The Armenian Foreign Ministry, the Eurasia Partnership Foundation, the Memorial-aligned Armenian human-rights community (Avetik Ishkhanyan and others), academic institutions including the AUA. Diaspora carriage primarily through the ARF press in paris, Beirut, washington and Glendale.

Reception

Domestic Armenian acceptance is conditional: most accept that civilian deaths occurred; few accept a genocide framing; many resist Azerbaijani inflation of the figures. The diaspora is more militant. Public reaction tends to invoke Sumgait 1988 and Baku January 1990 as the proper context: a cycle of atrocities, not a unilateral one.

Daily reality

Khojaly is not commemorated officially in Armenia. School curricula treat it within the general 1992 war framing rather than as a stand-alone event. Online discourse is heated and frequently crosses into denial. The Armenian Genocide Museum in yerevan does not engage with Khojaly directly.

Statistics

Memorial Human Rights Center confirmed 161 dead, with reasonable estimates up to ~485. HRW documented "the largest massacre to date in the conflict" with civilian deaths in the hundreds. The Azerbaijani 613 figure has not been independently verified. The Russian 366th Motor Rifle Regiment's role is debated; HRW found "elements" present.

Tensions and recent shifts

Post-2020 the position has had to absorb Azerbaijan's diplomatic offensive on Khojaly. Pashinyan's general policy of de-escalation includes avoiding direct argument over the casualty figure. editorial The 2023 events have shifted the comparative ground; Armenian discourse increasingly frames Khojaly within a wider mutual-atrocity record rather than as a standalone Azerbaijani memory.

Critique

Omitted facts. Battlefield context is real but does not address the killings on the announced corridor (Memorial Human Rights Center, 1992, Findings §4–§5). The most credible reconstruction (Memorial, HRW, de Waal) finds that civilians were deliberately shot as they fled, not lost in close-quarters combat alone. Armenian official statements from the Kocharyan period (2000s) under-engage with this finding.

Logical fallacies. Tu quoque: invoking Sumgait and Baku 1990 is historically correct but does not resolve the responsibility question for Khojaly itself. Composition: attributing civilian deaths to the chaotic exit treats the column as if it were a single object, when the documented record distinguishes between exposure deaths during the flight and deliberate close-range killings near Nakhichevanik (Memorial Human Rights Center, 1992, Findings §4–§5). Deflection of responsibility to the Russian 366th Motor Rifle Regiment runs against the documented record: HRW found "elements" of the 366th present, not the killing units (Human Rights Watch, 1992, pp. 19–22).

Propaganda techniques. Where some ARF outlets approach denial that a massacre took place, this position is contradicted by HRW, Memorial, de Waal, and Mutallibov's own 1992 interview (Human Rights Watch, 1992); the position should be regarded as denialist, not as a legitimate Armenian framing. Minimisation by selective citation (preferring the lower Memorial floor of 161 over de Waal's reconstructed ~485) trades on the figure's ambiguity. editorial

What survives. The Armenian position correctly resists the legal-genocide label: it is not the framing used by HRW, Memorial, de Waal or any major court on the documented record (Human Rights Watch, 1992). The point about Mutallibov's political abandonment is also documented in the contemporaneous record. What does not survive: the framing that civilians died only in the chaos of the exit, and the denialist sub-line that no massacre took place.

Sources: Memorial Human Rights Center, 1992
academic-consensus
Academic / NGO consensus: war crime; civilian deaths in the hundreds

The NGO and scholarly consensus is that Khojaly was a major war crime committed during the Armenian capture of the town (Human Rights Watch, 1992). Human Rights Watch called it the largest massacre in the conflict to that date (Human Rights Watch, 1992, Ch. 2). Memorial confirmed at least 161 civilian deaths and reported higher estimates (Memorial Human Rights Center, 1992, Tally §6); other accounts place deaths in the several hundreds, with de Waal settling at around 485 (Thomas de Waal, 2003, pp. 172–178). Responsibility includes Armenian and Karabakh Armenian forces, with debated participation or enabling conduct by the 366th Motor Rifle Regiment.

The full position internal divisions, supporting actors, reception, daily reality — click to collapse

Internal divisions

The synthesis is held by HRW, Memorial, and most Western Caucasus specialists. They differ on details. HRW's 1992 report (hrw bloodshed caucasus 1992) and 1994 follow-up (hrw azerbaijan seven years) treat the event as a war crime with elements of atrocity, focusing on documented deaths and the responsibility of named units. Memorial's investigation produced the 161-confirmed figure, which it explicitly described as a floor rather than a ceiling. de Waal gives ~485, drawing on hospital records and witness interviews. None of them treat the event as genocide in the legal sense, which would require demonstrating specific intent to destroy a protected group.

How prominent figures argue this

Holly Cartner (HRW Helsinki, then in the field), Oleg Orlov and Sergei Kovalev (Memorial), Thomas de Waal. Their accounts converge on key facts: Armenian forces took the town in a military operation; civilian residents fled along corridors that were either inadequate or shelled; many deaths occurred in panic; some were summary executions. The Russian 366th Motor Rifle Regiment had elements present but the chain of command is unclear.

Carriers

NGO reports, Western university press books, peer-reviewed articles. The framing is reproduced in ICG briefings, US State Department and FCDO assessments, and most Western journalistic coverage.

Reception

Reception in the policy world is high; both publics regard the consensus as biased toward the other side. The Azerbaijani position treats the Memorial figure as denial-by-other-means; the Armenian position treats the war-crime designation as inflation.

Daily reality

The consensus has had limited impact on either domestic discourse but is the framing used in international fora when Khojaly is discussed substantively. It rarely receives institutional commemoration outside academic journals and HRW/Memorial archives. editorial

Statistics

Memorial: 161 confirmed civilian dead, with estimates up to ~485. HRW does not give a single figure but documents "deaths in the several hundreds". de Waal (2003): ~485. The Azerbaijani official figure of 613 has not been independently corroborated. The Russian 366th Regiment's role: HRW documents elements present; full unit involvement is contested.

Tensions and recent shifts

The consensus has held since the mid-1990s. Recent NGO work, including on the 2022–23 blockade and the 2023 operation, has begun to be cited by both sides in support of their Khojaly arguments. sourced opinion The methodological standards Memorial established for Khojaly (separation of confirmed from estimated deaths, documentation of unit responsibility) are now being applied to the 2023 events.

Critique

Omitted facts. None material to the consensus's central findings; the consensus itself is built on the documented record. What it under-emphasises is the durability of denial on both sides: the Armenian denialist sub-position (some ARF outlets) and the Azerbaijani inflationist position (the 613 figure as authoritative) both persist in their respective political ecosystems despite the consensus.

Logical fallacies. The framing risks the inverse of false equivalence: by holding to a careful war-crime characterisation, the consensus is read by both publics as biased toward the other side, which is itself a sign that the consensus is doing useful work (International Crisis Group, 2005). editorial

Propaganda techniques. None — but the consensus is itself instrumentalised, with each side citing the parts that suit them: Azerbaijan cites HRW's "largest massacre" language, Armenia cites Memorial's lower confirmed figure. The selective uptake is itself a feature of the dispute. editorial

What survives. Almost everything: a war crime committed by Armenian and Karabakh Armenian forces; civilian deaths in the hundreds; deliberate killing on the announced corridor; Russian 366th Regiment elements present but not as the killing units; the genocide label not legally supported. This is the framing the atlas adopts.

Sources: Human Rights Watch, 1992 · Memorial Human Rights Center, 1992 · Thomas de Waal, 2003

References

  1. 1. Waal, T. d. (2003). Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan Through Peace and War. NYU Press. https://nyupress.org/9780814760321/black-garden/

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    book neutral-academic paywalled disputed source
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    pp. 175–176; pp. 175–177; pp. 176–177 (quoting Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 2 April 1992); pp. 175–178; Postscript; pp. 173–175; pp. 172–178
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    vp-1967-body ¶1, vp-1967-critique ¶3, vp-1967-critique ¶1, vp-1967-critique ¶2, vp-1968-body ¶1, vp-1968-critique ¶3, vp-1968-critique ¶4, vp-1969-body ¶1
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  2. 2. Memorial Human Rights Center (1992). Report on the Mass Violations of Human Rights in Khojaly. Memorial. https://www.memo.ru/en-us/memorial/departments/intermemorial/news/367

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    ngo_report ngo
    Locator
    Reconstruction §3; Tally §6; Findings §4–§5
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    vp-1967-critique ¶1, vp-1968-body ¶1, vp-1968-critique ¶1, vp-1968-critique ¶2, vp-1968-critique ¶3, vp-1968-critique ¶4, vp-1969-body ¶1
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  3. 3. Human Rights Watch (1992). Bloodshed in the Caucasus: Escalation of the Armed Conflict in Nagorno Karabakh. Human Rights Watch / Helsinki. https://www.hrw.org/reports/pdfs/a/azerbjn/azerbaij929.pdf

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    p. 5; pp. 17–22; pp. 19–22; Ch. 2
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    vp-1967-critique ¶2, vp-1968-body ¶1, vp-1968-critique ¶1, vp-1968-critique ¶2, vp-1968-critique ¶3, vp-1968-critique ¶4, vp-1969-body ¶1
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  4. 4. Human Rights Watch (1994). Azerbaijan: Seven Years of Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. Human Rights Watch / Helsinki. https://www.hrw.org/report/1994/12/01/seven-years-conflict-nagorno-karabakh

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    vp-1969-body ¶1
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  5. 5. International Crisis Group (2005). Reports on Nagorno-Karabakh. International Crisis Group. https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/caucasus/nagorno-karabakh-conflict

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    vp-1969-critique ¶2
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