Two Peoples, One Land
Disputes

2022–23 Lachin blockade and military operation

How should the nine-month blockade and the September 2023 operation be characterised in international law?

History all versions

The legal characterisation of the 2022-23 blockade and September 2023 operation is the live dispute of the post-war period. Azerbaijan describes its actions as restoration of sovereignty, environmental protest, checkpoint regulation and a local anti-terrorist operation against illegal armed formations. Armenia, Artsakh institutions and several genocide-prevention advocates describe a deliberate coercive sequence designed to make Armenian life in Nagorno-Karabakh impossible. The ICJ did not rule on genocide or ethnic cleansing, but it repeatedly ordered unimpeded movement through Lachin and later ordered protection of departure, documents and possible return. The European Parliament called the outcome ethnic cleansing. Ocampo and Genocide Watch used genocide language. The strongest settled description is forced displacement following unlawful blockade and military coercion; genocide remains a contested legal characterisation.

Events under dispute

Perspectives (3)

How to read this section
Each position is laid out in its own voice first, the way its proponents argue it. Where that argument relies on omitted facts, logical fallacies, or recognised state-propaganda techniques, those are noted in a separate Critique block under the position. The intent is not to suppress any view, but to show what each side asserts and where its case is weaker than the assertion makes it sound.
state-azerbaijan
Azerbaijani state position: anti-terrorist measure; voluntary departure

Azerbaijan argues that it restored constitutional order on its internationally recognised territory, that the Lachin restrictions concerned illegal mining, weapons movement and border control, and that Armenians left voluntarily despite offers of reintegration. The state rejects blockade, ethnic cleansing and genocide characterisations.

The full position internal divisions, supporting actors, reception, daily reality — click to collapse

Internal divisions

The Azerbaijani position is institutionally homogeneous in public, with strict message discipline under YAP. The harder version, used by ilham aliyev and the Defence Ministry, treats the September operation as a sovereign anti-terror action against unlawful formations. The softer version, used in diplomatic channels by Hikmet Hajiyev (presidential foreign policy aide) and at the ICJ, emphasises that the Lachin restrictions were lawful border-control measures, that "voluntary departure" reflects legitimate disagreement with the new administration, and that reintegration offers were genuine. Independent Azerbaijani journalists in exile (Khadija Ismayilova, the abzas.net circle) reject the official line.

How prominent figures argue this

ilham aliyev in his September 2023 victory addresses framed the operation as the "logical conclusion" of the 2020 war, restoring constitutional order on Azerbaijani territory. The Foreign Ministry under Jeyhun Bayramov insists Lachin was "regulated", not "blockaded". Defence Minister Zakir Hasanov framed the September operation as targeting "illegal armed formations" rather than civilians. Hikmet Hajiyev has repeated in international fora that ~10,000 reintegration packets were prepared but rejected.

Carriers

Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry, Defence Ministry, the Aliyev presidency, YAP media (Trend, Azertac, Report.az), the diplomatic corps, the AzerEnergy and SOCAR networks (used in informal diplomacy with EU energy partners). The "Western Azerbaijan Community" provides a parallel narrative track that frames Armenian flight as historical reciprocity.

Reception

Domestic reception is high under managed media conditions; the September operation produced a wave of public celebration. International reception is split: Turkey, Pakistan, Israel, Hungary support; the EU formally condemned through the EP resolution but maintained gas supplies (Azerbaijan supplied ~12 bcm to the EU in 2023). Western governments split between human-rights statements and continued energy cooperation. sourced opinion

Daily reality

The Azerbaijani population observed the operation as televised triumph. Public reintegration ceremonies in Agdam and Fuzuli showcased returning Azerbaijani IDPs. The "Great Return programme" has resettled tens of thousands of formerly displaced Azerbaijanis. The narrative of "voluntary departure" has been institutionalised in tourism literature and museum signage in formerly Armenian-held territories.

Statistics

Pre-September 2023 Karabakh Armenian population: ~120,000. UNHCR-registered refugees in Armenia by 4 October 2023: 100,617. Remaining Armenians in Karabakh as of September 2024: 14. Azerbaijani IDPs returned to liberated districts by 2024: ~50,000. Casualties from the September operation: ~200–300 Armenian dead per Karabakh authorities; Azerbaijani figures undisclosed.

Tensions and recent shifts

The position has had to absorb the November 2023 ICJ order on safe departure, documents and return. Aliyev publicly invited Armenians to return; few have. Internal pressure for normalising heritage treatment has grown as the Dadivank / Gandzasar cases attract sustained Western media attention. editorial

Critique

This account is difficult to reconcile with the ICJ’s Lachin orders, the humanitarian record of shortages, the checkpoint regime and the near-total flight of the population after the military operation.

international-body
European Parliament / ICJ: blockade unlawful; events constitute ethnic cleansing

The ICJ ordered Azerbaijan to ensure unimpeded movement along Lachin in February 2023 and reaffirmed the measure in July. After the September operation, it ordered Azerbaijan to protect safe departure, documents and return. The European Parliament described the mass departure as ethnic cleansing and called for sanctions.

The full position internal divisions, supporting actors, reception, daily reality — click to collapse

Internal divisions

The international-body position is multi-layered and not unified. The ICJ used technically narrow language under the ICERD Convention: it ordered measures (free movement on Lachin, then safe departure) without ruling on the substantive characterisation. The European Parliament used the political category "ethnic cleansing" by 491–9. The Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly went further, with rapporteur reports suggesting genocidal patterns. The ICRC and UNHCR focused on humanitarian conditions and registration. The OSCE / Minsk Group was effectively dormant by 2023, with France pushing harder than the US or Russia for Armenian protection.

How prominent figures argue this

ocampo, former ICC Chief Prosecutor, in his August 2023 legal opinion argued the blockade satisfied Article II(c) of the 1948 Convention (deliberately inflicting destructive conditions of life). Genocide Watch escalated its alert level. Joan Donoghue, then ICJ Vice-President, and the majority of the Court delivered the 13–2 February 2023 order. Roberta Metsola, EP President, presided over the October 2023 EP resolution. Council of Europe Commissioner Dunja Mijatović issued multiple statements.

Carriers

ICJ, EP, CoE, UNHCR, ICRC, HRW, Genocide Watch, the Lemkin Institute. Western governments individually: France (the most forward), Netherlands, Czech Republic, Lithuania. The US State Department issued statements but maintained energy and security ties; the EU continued gas trade with Azerbaijan.

Reception

Mixed reception in implementation. The interim measures were not enforced. Sanctions called for by the EP were not imposed. The diplomatic effort to keep Azerbaijan engaged in normalisation with Armenia continued through 2024. The position is therefore strong rhetorically and weak operationally.

Daily reality

The ICJ orders are part of a continuing inter-State case (Armenia v. Azerbaijan), with merits proceedings still pending. The case has produced an unprecedented documentary record on Lachin, the blockade and the September operation. EU normalisation diplomacy continues in brussels; the US has hosted Armenian–Azerbaijani foreign-minister meetings in Washington. The international position has succeeded in establishing the legal record while failing to alter the outcome.

Statistics

ICJ February 2023 order: 13–2. EP October 2023 resolution: 491–9 with 33 abstentions. UNHCR registration: 100,617 displaced 24 September–4 October 2023. November 2023 ICJ order on safe departure, documents and return: continuing.

Tensions and recent shifts

The pattern is recurring: strong international legal language, weak implementation. The ICJ proceedings continue; merits judgment will arrive years from now. The most consequential institutional shift may be the EP's threshold-crossing language on "ethnic cleansing", which provides a vocabulary that Western states can use without bearing the full legal weight of "genocide". editorial The Council of Europe rapporteur process continues to push the legal characterisation forward.

Critique

International bodies produced strong language and binding interim measures, but enforcement was weak. The population was displaced before legal protection became operational.

Sources: International Court of Justice, 2023 · International Court of Justice, 2023 · International Court of Justice, 2023 · European Parliament, 2023
state-armenia
Armenian state position: genocide

The Armenian position treats the blockade and operation as a genocidal sequence: deprivation of food, medicine, fuel and movement, followed by attack and coerced exodus. Ocampo’s opinion framed the blockade under Article II(c) of the Genocide Convention as deliberately inflicting destructive conditions of life.

The full position internal divisions, supporting actors, reception, daily reality — click to collapse

Internal divisions

The Armenian position is unusually unified across its political spectrum on this dispute. pashinyan's Civil Contract government, the opposition Republican Party and ARF all support the genocide characterisation. The Karabakh refugee community pushes hardest for it; the Pashinyan government uses it more cautiously, in part to avoid undermining ongoing normalisation talks. Within the diaspora, the position is consensus.

How prominent figures argue this

pashinyan's government formally invoked genocide language in the post-September 2023 period, framed around Ocampo's opinion. Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan made the argument at the UN Human Rights Council. Former Karabakh president Arayik Harutyunyan (now in Azerbaijani custody as of 2023) was the political face of the Karabakh-defence position. Armenian-American legal scholars Geoffrey Robertson and Sarah Cleveland have written supporting analyses. The Lemkin Institute and Genocide Watch issued formal alerts.

Carriers

The Armenian Foreign Ministry, the Office of the Prosecutor General (Armenia is gathering evidence for inter-State and individual proceedings), the Armenian-American assembly (ANCA), the ARF political infrastructure, diaspora legal advocacy organisations. Genocide Watch, the Lemkin Institute, and several Western law schools (Yale Genocide Studies, USC Shoah Foundation) carry the academic version.

Reception

International reception is mixed. The ethnic-cleansing characterisation is broadly accepted; the genocide characterisation faces a higher legal threshold (specific intent under Article II). Western governments individually have not adopted "genocide" language, though Robert Habeck (Germany), some French officials, and various US Congressional figures have used it. The wider Armenian public accepts it across political lines.

Daily reality

The genocide framing has become foundational to Armenian state action: in the ICJ inter-State case, in evidence-gathering for individual prosecutions, and in domestic commemoration. Memorial complexes for the 2023 displaced have begun construction in yerevan and Vanadzor. The roughly 100,000 displaced are integrated into Armenian society but maintain political identity as Karabakh-origin; their schools, churches and community organisations preserve a distinct identity.

Statistics

Displaced: 100,617 (UNHCR). Pre-September 2023 population: ~120,000. Remaining Armenians: 14. Ocampo opinion: identifies blockade as Article II(c) violation of the 1948 Convention. ICJ orders: three, all ignored. Karabakh civilian dead during September 2023 operation: ~200; subsequent prisoner trials ongoing in baku.

Tensions and recent shifts

The position has hardened steadily since August 2023. Pashinyan, who had been more measured, adopted full genocide language after September 2023. The continuing trial in Baku of former Karabakh leaders (Bako Sahakyan, Arkady Ghukasyan, Davit Babayan, Davit Manukyan, Levon Mnatsakanyan, and the businessman Ruben Vardanyan) is treated by the Armenian government as further evidence of state-level intent. editorial The position's principal weakness is the legal threshold for specific intent in genocide jurisprudence.

Critique

The genocide argument is legally serious but not adjudicated. The evidentiary threshold for specific intent remains high, even where the ethnic-cleansing description is strongly supported.

Sources: Luis Moreno Ocampo, 2023